Kuwait's democratic exceptionalism is challenged by the recent suspension of the Kuwaiti parliament and certain articles of the constitution, an event that for many citizens and interested observers alike seemed both improbable and inevitable.
The Constitution Monument in Al Shaheed Park (Kuwait City) commemorating the 50th anniversary of the country's constitution.
Scholars have long pointed out the challenge of categorizing Kuwait as a fixed regime type. The most accurate description is that of a hybrid: a semi-democratic, 'dynastic monarchy.' [1] In practice, however, the executive retains substantial control over the "democratic" elements of the regime through political maneuvering. These features create a unique political arrangement where Kuwaitis speak reverently of the emir while also highlighting their democratic rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly – privileges not granted to the populations of neighboring countries.Yet, public satisfaction has been steadily decreasing for the past decade. To begin with, Kuwaitis complain of the effects of economic stagnation on their ability to sustain their accustomed level of comfort and, for many, of affluence. In addition, the country's standing in areas of national pride has likewise been declining. Kuwait in the heyday of the 1960s and ‘70s was considered the Pioneer of the Gulf in education, arts, and sports. Today it is significantly outpaced by its neighbors. Sixty-three years into their democratic experiment, many Kuwaitis view these regressive trends as a direct consequence of the complications of parliamentary and democratic practices. Indeed, for years many have been asking whether democracy has gotten in the way of progress.
Nonetheless, ideologically and socioeconomically diverse groups – composed of liberals, Islamists, socialists, Shia, Sunnis, city dwellers (Hadar) and tribal peoples (Bedouins) - continue to regularly contest elections for parliament. Since 2006 especially, [2] the popularly elected representatives of these groups and the emir-appointed government have frequently come to a head upon that battlefield called the National Assembly. This dynamic has led to recurrent emiri decrees that dissolved parliaments, reshuffled cabinets, and called for new elections to break the gridlock between the legislative and executive branches. In turn, the ensuing political stagnation has complicated efforts to implement the country’s national and developmental goal to “restore the regional leadership role of Kuwait as a financial and commercial hub,” as conceptualized in the 2017 National Development Plan (“2035 Vision”). [3]
It is hardly surprising that Kuwaitis’ perspectives on the National Assembly, assessed shortly before the last election of 2024, revealed strong negative sentiment against the parliament. In fact, 60 percent responded that “the government could carry out effective actions if it were not held back by the parliament.” [4]
And indeed, parliament and government cooperation has become increasingly difficult, with parliamentarians criticizing the government’s interference in their affairs and vice versa. To counter this interference, parliamentarians have adopted a more direct approach in the last decade or so, becoming increasingly confrontational toward the emir and government ministers, a trend that began with Musallam Al-Barrak's famous 2012 “We will not allow you” speech. For the act of criticizing the then-emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Sabah, directly—deemed criminal in Kuwait—warning that the people would not allow His Highness to “take Kuwait into the abyss of autocracy,” Al-Barrak faced severe legal repercussions. [5]
et, similar confrontational attitudes have since been regularly expressed by parliamentarians. In fact, warnings to parliamentarians to tone down their rhetoric and, from the perspective of the authorities, respect the constitutional powers of the emir were issued by the current emir when he served as Crown Prince. [6] Nevertheless, both Kuwaitis and political observers were shocked by the emir's decision on May 10th, 2024, to suspend parliament and several key provisions of the constitution for up to four years. The stated justification for the suspensions was a speech delivered by an MP, which the emir considered offensive. [7] While some view speaking directly to power as a sign of progress, these solitary acts have proven detrimental to the opposition's goal of further democratization, even leading to the imprisonment of several MPs shortly after the announcement of the suspension of parliament and the constitution. [8]
For many, the country’s politics over the past decade has resembled a rudderless ship – with mass protests over corruption, multiple dissolutions of parliament, and countless elections. As a result, many Kuwaitis view the emiri decision as an inevitable and necessary intervention in an ongoing cycle of tit-for-tat between elected parliament members and appointed government ministers.
In a televised May 10th speech, [9] Sheikh Mishaal warned that he would “not allow that democracy be exploited to destroy the state ...” referencing to the recent behaviors of specific MPs he felt had infringed on his executive prerogatives granted by the constitution (to name a Crown Prince of his choosing, for instance). In addition, he asserted that parliamentary pressure (via interpellations, or “grillings” of ministers) was leveraged against several governments which, he argued, led these administrations to overlook violations allowing corruption to spread throughout “most of the state’s facilities and ... economic and security institutions.” [10]
It is understandable why many Kuwaitis, grappling with worsening economic conditions (including high loan debt) [11] and concerned about projected demographic shifts and unemployment rates [12] (Kuwait has the highest youth unemployment in the Gulf) [13], while eyeing the impressive economic and developmental strides of their neighbors, warmly welcomed the emiri decision. For others, whose political socialization has shaped their expectation of having substantive input in their country’s governance, the unilateral nature of the decision feels like an affront to their identity and their role as stakeholders in the historic social contract between the people and the Al-Sabah dynasty. Indeed, Kuwaitis take pride in their considerable political influence in relation to the ruling family, a distinctive and privileged position compared to citizens of other Gulf countries. This sense of political efficacy was most recently demonstrated by the relatively high voter turnout of 62% in the last elections [14], the fourth in just four years. [15] The critical question now for this historically seafaring nation is: where is the ship headed?
For the time being, “all aspects of the democratic practice will be reviewed, and the findings of the study will be referred to us to take what we deem appropriate,” the emir stated.[16] Within Kuwaiti society presently, political speculation, much like conspiracy theories, is being widely circulated, with numerous predictions about potential changes to the sixty-two-year-old constitution propagated. These range from minor adjustments and a quick return to parliamentary life to the gradual transformation of the regime into something resembling the political structures of the UAE or Saudi Arabia. Currently, the average Kuwaiti anticipates that parliament will return, though its form and method of election may undergo changes.
Timelines are also put forth. Some optimistically predict that popular pressure to return to parliamentary life will be evident as soon as 6-10 months. This assumption, it should be noted, is based on precedent. Public pressure following the 1976 and 1986 suspensions [17], although not immediately evident, resulted in the reinstatement of the parliament and constitution without any changes. [18] According to an Arab Barometer survey conducted shortly before the last election, although Kuwaitis expressed significant disillusionment with the parliament’s performance and the democratic system itself, they espoused far greater support for the continuity of democracy in Kuwait. Indeed, 85 percent agreed that “democratic systems may have problems, yet they are better than other systems.” [19]
Further evidence that Kuwaiti political culture has embedded within it a keen sense of the importance of participatory governance are references citizens make to the country’s historic past of consensus building. The initial public reaction to the suspension has been subdued, but according to many Kuwaitis I have spoken to, both supporters and opponents of the decision, many say they are prepared to rally for the return of parliament if the new government fails to deliver on its promises of reform in a timely manner. Kuwaitis have high expectations for significant reform and progress and are closely scrutinizing the government’s performance during this period. At the same time, some are questioning whether democracy has truly been abused in Kuwait, or whether the version of democracy practiced was simply too limited in scope. Given these views, interested observers are wondering: how long will the grace period granted to the authorities last, and will it be smooth sailing until then?
Notes
1. Michael Herb, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999)
10. Ibid.
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